Motivation and Literature Overview
The credit default swap market historically was a very fast growing market till the end of year 2007. From the second half 2007 to the first half 2008 we find a heavy decrease by 12.16 % from 62.17 trillion dollars to 54.61 trillion dollars which represents the first slump since 2001. From this point on till the first half of 2009 the notional outstanding amount nearly halved to 31.22 trillion dollars. 1 This outstanding growth and today's situation on the financial markets world-wide is motivation enough to analyze the behavior and the relationship between European standardized Credit Default Swap (CDS) indices and the stock market. It is well known that the consequences of the subprime crisis starting in 2007 are the rise of credit spreads and the fall of stock markets. Against this background it is interesting to know if an information transfer between the stock and the CDS markets is observable since this would help to understand information flows between the financial markets. There are a couple of studies analyzing the relationship between CDS and stock markets. But, to our knowledge, no study dedicated to the question if the relationship between these two markets changes from an ante-subprime to the subprime period. 2 The understanding of information flows during the subprime crisis compared to the information transfer in non-crisis scenarios is a valuable complement to the existing literature on the link between stock and CDS markets.
Before getting into the issue in question we give a short overview of the literature including some statistical results in addition to the essential results of the studies. Norden and Weber (2009) implement a vector autoregression (VAR) model on 58 international company names to identify comovements between stock, bonds and CDS markets. They focus on a singlename analysis and a time horizon from January 2000 to December 2002 on a daily and weekly basis. Norden and Weber (2009) split up their data set into two subsets. Subset 1 covers the period from January 2000 to June 2001 and subset 2 comprises the period from July 2001 to December 2002. In contrast to the paper on hand this was not done to examine impacts from a macro-economic downturn movement but to provide a back-testing for the findings between subset 1 and subset 2. Correlations between stock and CDS markets calculated by a Spearman coefficient are observed to be negative and mostly significant at a 1 % level. On a weekly basis they detect a median correlation of 0.25 and on a daily basis of 0.1. Due to autocorrelation tests they find stock, CDS and bond prices to be autocorrelated whereas autocorrelation for returns on these asset classes is negligible up to the fifth lag. The results show a lead of stock markets to the bonds and CDS markets. Furthermore, it can be concluded that CDS markets lead bond markets. In general, the response is stronger on a daily than on a weekly basis. Fung et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between stock markets and the family CDX of CDS indices. Concretely, they use the CDX.NA.IG, based on investment-grade entities, and the CDX.NA.HY, based on high-yield names, on a daily data history ranging from April 2004 to December 2007. Thus, the analysis approximately covers the first 10 months of the financial crisis. The authors construct a hypothesized index from January 2001 to March 2004 by actual spreads from constituents of these indices. As benchmark stock indices they consider the S&P 500 and two other indices containing the same references like the CDX counterparts. Fung et al. observe a Pearson correlation coefficient of approximately 0.34 for both, IG and HY, with S&P 500 at 1 % level of significance over the whole sample period. In addition, they find a close relationship between CDS indices and stock markets during the credit crunch in mid-February 2007. Using a vector autoregression (VAR) model they conclude the stock market to lead the investment-grade and high-yield CDS market.
An analysis using the family iTraxx of CDS indices is provided by Byström (2008) who examines the relationship of iTraxx CDS and stock prices by several statistical procedures. His study comprises iTraxx sectoral indices such as Industrials, Autos, TMT, Energy, Consumers, Subordinated and Senior Financials as well as the corresponding sectoral stock indices. His research is based on a daily data series from 21 st June 2004 to 18 th April 2005 which consists of the very first 10 months of trading in iTraxx. On the one hand Byström observes significant positive first order autocorrelation within the CDS indices (except from iTraxx Autos) and no autocorrelation for the stock indices tested by Ljung-Box test and OLS regressions. On the other hand Byström concludes from rank and Pearson's correlation analysis that CDS spreads tend to widen if stock prices fall and vice versa. Moreover, he finds volatility of stock index returns to be significantly negatively correlated with iTraxx CDS spreads and company-specific information embedded in the stock prices before it appears in iTraxx CDS spreads.
In the study on hand we examine the influences of the financial crisis on the relationship between CDS indices and the stock market for European markets. Furthermore, a brief crosscontinental analysis is provided as we do not only take into account European stock indices but additionally the Dow Jones Industrial Average from the U.S. market. Our analysis is based on a daily (from 2 nd January 2007 until 29 th May 2009) and on a weekly basis (26 th September 2004 until 29 th May 2009) for CDS iTraxx and stock indices. Thus, the impact of a less frequent trading period (weekly level instead of a daily level) and the corresponding information transfer is considered as well. In addition, due to our large data history containing at least 2 years and 5 months for the daily data history we expect that our results sketch a statistically more valid picture than the results from Byström who incorporated only a 10 months data history.
In comparison to Fung et al. (2008) we are able to involve a larger subprime data history of nearly 22 months which contains 12 months more of information. To our knowledge we are the first who investigate the changes in the transfer of risk information between markets within a common financial environment and markets within a financial crisis for the European market. Against this background the question arises, how the relationship between CDS and stock indices changes if economies move into a macro-economic downturn period. In this context we deal with the problem if there is an informational breach between markets before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, we split up our data history into two subsets as will be explained in more detail in the following section. The analysis is performed by using a Granger-causal regression with a separate estimate of maximum lags which have to be considered. We determine the maximum lags for each VAR system separately by the use of the Schwarz-Bayes and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. 3 Available studies on standardized indices (e.g. Byström (2008) ) are focused on the iTraxx sector indices. Compared to Byström our focus is not solely based on sector indices but also on the very important benchmark indices iTraxx Europe, iTraxx Europe Crossover and iTraxx HiVol. Consequently, our analysis uses the main benchmark indices that are traded over futures contracts at the EUREX.
Because we involve standardized indices we focus on the systematic risk information transfer which differs from the contribution of Norden and Weber (2009) who analyze the singlename risk information flow. On the one hand the advantage of an analysis on single-name CDS is that the idiosyncratic factor plays a major role compared to the systematic factor. On the other hand the evaluation of the overall relationship between different markets on a singlename basis is difficult because of the undiversified idiosyncratic risk. Therefore we use market indices since in that case idiosyncratic risk is negligible and systematic risk takes the center stage and interaction of different markets can be analyzed without accounting for firm specific characteristics. Against this background it is not surprising to us that some of our results differ from Norden and Weber (2009) . Concretely, we find a day-of-the-week effect in the weekly returns which not occurs in the study of Norden and Weber.
The article is organized as follows: In section 2 we start with a description of our procedural methodology, followed by a presentation of the data basis and a brief statistical analysis in section 3. Section 4 deals with the statistical analysis of Granger-causality over the whole sample period. Section 5 provides a corresponding analysis of the two sub-periods and section 6 deals with anomalies in the weekly returns. Section 7 concludes with a short summary.
Methodology

The Partitioning of the Data Set
The aim of our study is to analyze if the interaction between credit and stock markets has changed during the financial crisis. As already mentioned our data history covers the time period from 26 th September 2004 until 29 th May 2009 on a weekly basis (in each case from Friday to Friday) and the period from 2 nd January 2007 until 29 th May 2009 on a daily basis. Thus, within both periods there is a time interval before and a time interval including the financial crisis. To identify possible changes in the interaction between stock and credit markets we have to find a trigger event that characterizes the beginning of the financial crisis. We used the 14 th June 2007 as this cut-off point in time because this date is determined by the Bank for International Settlements to be the first key event that induced the financial crisis in Europe. 4 Therefore we run a Chow-test on the investigated return series to determine if there is evidence for a structural interrupt in the data history at this date. The results show a unique break at a 1 % level of significance in the data history at this point in time. 5 The time period before 14 th June 2007 acts as a kind of benchmark period because within this period the economy in Germany and Europe was running at a "normal" level, which in turn means that there were no extraordinary events in the credit and stock markets. The second time period therefore characterizes the period where the financial crisis hits Europe and the credit and stock markets began to change their behavior as can be observed in the rapid decrease of the stock markets and the increase of the spreads in the CDS markets. On the basis of these two time periods and the corresponding data sets it is possible to analyze the interaction between the markets and to identify possible changes within this interaction by moving from the noncrisis to the crisis period.
In addition, we examine the behavior of the markets for the whole sample period in order to show the problems arising from the analysis of data when there is an extraordinary event included. The results show that there are significant differences between the analysis of the two subsets and the whole sample.
Granger-Causality
We analyze the interaction between the credit and stock markets using the concept of Granger-causality. This method was introduced by Granger (1969) to identify possible links and lead-lag relationships between different time series. In this sense a series X is said to Granger-cause a series Y if X values provide statistically significant information about future values of Y. Since it is possible that each of the two variables Granger-causes the second (so called feedback systems), Granger-causality does not necessarily imply actual causality. Against this background we firstly have to justify that there is a reasonable economic link between the considered series. This aspect is given in our analysis, because several studies as Norden/Weber (2009) and Fung et al. (2008) have shown, that there is a lead-lag relationship between stock and CDS markets. Moreover, it is economically plausible to assume a relationship between these two markets because it is well known that a negative change in the creditworthiness of a firm has a direct consequence for the equity value of the firm and vice versa. 6
Another assumption that has to be fulfilled in the context of Granger-causality is the (trend-) stationarity of the underlying time series. The link between creditworthiness and the equity value of a firm is the fundament of structural models like Merton (1974) . 7 See Greene (2003) for more information about the ADF test and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) for more information about the KPSS test. 8 In brief, the Phillips-Perron test checks a time series for the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of no unit root. If the null hypothesis is rejected then a time series is claimed to be stationary. stationary. Against this background, all of our results are backed by a second or even a third statistical procedure.
The concept of Granger-causality is based on a VAR model. In our analysis the considered data set consists of two time series (CDS) 
where i , (stock) i, j and (CDS) i, j (i = 1, 2) are the coefficients that are estimated by the ordinary least square method. 1,t and 2,t have to fulfill the usual restrictions of uncorrelated error terms. To determine the optimal number m * of lags that has to be incorporated into the VAR model we use two well accepted procedures: the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) and the Hannan Quinn Information Criterion (HQC). 10 After applying both criteria we decided to take the maximum of both quantities as the optimal lag length m * and denote the VAR model by VAR(m * ). Since almost we are confronted with the case m * = 1, in addition, we test fixed lag lengths of m = 2 (on a weekly basis) and m = 5 (on a daily basis) but the results do not change significantly implying both criteria to work well.
After estimating the optimal lag length the Granger-causality test can be performed. The null hypothesis H 0 "the time series ( 
Analogously, according to equation (2) 
Both null hypotheses are assessed by a F-statistic using a decomposition of the model into a restricted and an unrestricted model. As the unrestricted model was already described by equation (1) and (2), respectively, the restricted model is obtained by setting all (stock ) 1, j and (CDS) 2, j , respectively, to zero, implying the restricted model to be an autoregressive process of order m * . The relevant F-statistic is a function of the residual sum of squares of the restricted (RSS rm ) and of the unrestricted model (RSS urm ) and is further referenced to be the relevant Granger statistic G: 9 We refer to the Granger-causality procedure presented in Greene (2003) . 10 These information criteria avoid an overfitting of the model by adding a penalty term to the residual sum of squares for every additional lag. As long as the reduction of the residual sum of squares is greater than the penalty term a additional lag is beneficial. The aim is to find the minimum of the information criterion by a given number of lags. We decided to use a maximal lag number of five, because this covers for daily data the period of one week.
The basic idea behind this procedure is to analyze if the entry of additional variables into the restricted model improves the explanatory power of the overall relationship significantly.
After the tests of the present study have been introduced the next section deals with the considered data series.
Data Description and Brief Statistical Analysis
In our analysis we focus on the European markets and, hence, on major iTraxx CDS indices as well as major European equity indices. On the one hand the considered iTraxx CDS indices are in detail iTraxx Europe (Europe), iTraxx Europe HiVol (HiVol), iTraxx Europe Crossover (Crossover), iTraxx Europe Non-Financials (NonFin), iTraxx Europe Financials Senior (FinSen) and iTraxx Europe Financials Subordinated (FinSub). The main iTraxx Europe index consists of 125 reference names. New series are issued every six months. Its high volatility counterpart (HiVol) includes 30 names with the highest spreads whereas the Crossover index consists of 50 names with a sub-investment grade. Non-Financials contains 100 reference entities from various industries such as Automobile, Energy, TMT etc. The Financials' indices are subject to 25 senior subordination financial entities (Financials Senior) and 25 junior subordination financial entities (Financials Subordinated). The iTraxx indices Europe, HiVol and Crossover are issued with 3, 5, 7 and 10 years of maturity. iTraxx Non-Financials, Financials Senior and Financials Subordinated are issued with 5 and 10 years of maturity. iTraxx European CDS indices provide the most liquid market for standardized CDS indices for European CDS counterparties. This rapidly growing market suffered strongly from the price erosion obtained by the impacts of the subprime crisis mid of June 2007. Table 1 about here For our statistical analysis we use weekly and daily iTraxx Credit Default Swap Index data for all six above mentioned indices with 10 years maturity whereby all indices are considered with closing spreads. 11 As already mentioned the considered time periods of the weekly data (from 26 th September 2004 to 29 th May 2009) and the daily data (from 2 nd January 2007 to 29 th May 2009) differ. However, to our knowledge this data basis is the largest one investigated within the standardized index trading context which in turn makes it possible to divide the data history in a non-crisis and a crisis period.
On the other hand, we consider 9 major European equity indices and also the Dow Jones Industrial Average in order to additionally consider cross-continental relationships. We investigate the main equity indices from the largest economies in Europe which are FTSE 100 (United Kingdom, FTSE), DAX 30 (Germany, DAX), CAC 40 (France, CAC), IBEX 35 (Spain, IBEX) and the STOXX50 (STO). To measure sector effects we use the following four Dow Jones Stoxx Supersector indices: Banks (DJBanks), Financial Services (DJFinS), Automobiles & Parts (DJAuto) and Industrial Goods & Services (DJInd). In these supersector indices companies have been classified by their primary revenue source. 12 We start our study with a first brief statistical analysis of index returns. In addition to the determination of different moments of the return distributions we test the returns for autocorrelation by a Ljung-Box (LB) test (H 0 : log-returns are autocorrelated) up to a maximum lag length of l max = int(12·(T/100) 0.25 ). 13 As can be seen in Table 2 , iTraxx Crossover and iTraxx Non-Financials are the only two indices that show no significant autocorrelation on a weekly basis and iTraxx Crossover on a daily basis, respectively. Thus, on weekly and on daily basis CDS data we observe clear indications for autocorrelated returns. Taking a quick look at the descriptive statistics we find the return distributions to be leptokurtic and most of them right-skewed. According to Table 3 In the next section we investigate the time series with respect to Granger-causality.
Analysis of Granger-causality for the Complete Sample Period
Since the application of Granger-causality is based on the assumption of trend-stationarity of the considered time series we additionally have to check this property. The results of the two tests of stationarity of the weekly returns are homogeneous. According to Table 4 After analyzing the stationarity characteristics we now come to the analysis of Grangercausality between the iTraxx CDS indices and the equity indices. Since we examine all possible combinations of equity and CDS indices with regard to Granger-causality the selection of 10 equity and 6 iTraxx CDS indices on a weekly and a daily basis obviously lead to 240 equations according to (1) and (2). Since the presentation of all 240 results would exceed the dimension of this article we only show the results with significant relationships in the sense of Granger-causality up to a 10 % level of significance. Results from the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion and the Hannan Quinn Information Criterion imply an optimal lag length m * = 1 or m * = 2 for all vector autoregression models. Thus, we have to consider both, VAR(1) and VAR(2) models.
First of all, we analyze all equations according to (1), i.e. we examine uni-directional 16 Granger-causality in the sense of "Equity Granger-causes CDS". As can be seen in Table 5 there are some relationships in which equity indices Granger-cause iTraxx CDS indices in the cases of VAR (1) are nearly all significant at a 1 % level of significance. This is also true for the significance of the Granger-statistic G.
In contrast, there are only three relationships on the weekly basis and the corresponding results are somewhat surprising because two of the coefficients (stock ) 1,1 are positive. This would mean that with increasing stock markets the credit spreads expand. This can also be observed by consideration of the correlation matrix when the correlation between the equity returns of t 1 and the CDS index returns of t is calculated which is almost positive. 17 These results will also be obtained for the post-subprime period as will be shown later. Since, at first sight, these results are surprising, we decided to take a closer look at the weekly returns in section 6. Furthermore, it should not go unnoticed that there are also two one-sided systems of type VAR(2) on the daily basis. These relationships can be detected for the HiVol and DJAuto index and for the Europe and DJAuto index as well. 18 In a next step we analyze all equations according to (2), i.e. we analyze Granger-causality in the sense of "CDS Granger-causes Equity". As can be seen in Table 6 there are just a few relationships in this sense of Granger-causality. This result is in line with the studies of 16 In the following the uni-directional cases of Granger-causality "(1)" or "(2)", respectively, are presented separately from the bi-directional cases "(1) and (2)", the above mentioned feedback systems. I.e. if an equity index Granger-causes a CDS index and the CDS index in turn Granger-causes the equity index we treat this case as a feedback system and not as a Granger-causality in the sense of (1) or (2). 17 It should be mentioned that most of the positive correlations are not significant. Results are available upon request. 18 More detailed information concerning this system is available from the authors upon request. Byström (2008) and Fung et al. (2008) which have shown that information is firstly embedded in the stock markets and then transported into the CDS market. Table 6 about here The last case to examine corresponds with the presence of feedback systems in the data that occur several times according to Table 7 . The most interesting feedback system is given by the weekly returns of the STOXX50 index (STO) and the iTraxx Financial Subordinated index (FinSub). A cross-continental feedback system can be found between weekly returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index (DJA) and the iTraxx Non-Financial index (NonFin). In the case "DJA Granger-causes NonFin" the coefficient (stock ) 1,1 is significant at the 1 % level while the coefficient (CDS) 1,1 is not significant. The other way round the coefficient (CDS) 2,1 is significant at the 1 % level whereas the coefficient (stock ) 2,1 is not significant. 19 Table 7 about here As a first intermediate result we obtain Granger-causalities between stock and CDS markets. These relationships are considerably stronger for daily returns than for weekly returns. The iTraxx indices with financial underlyings are often Granger-caused by the equity indices. We keep this in mind because the sample period includes the time before the beginning of the financial crisis and also the time during the financial crisis. In a next step we analyze the relationship between stock and CDS markets for the two sub-periods to identify changes within the relationship before and during the financial crises.
Granger-causality Analysis for the Split-up Periods
Analogously to the analysis of the overall period under consideration we also have to test stationarity of the time series for the separated sub-periods. The results are presented in Table  8 . 20 According to the ADF test for all indices and both sub-periods we identify a rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationary returns at a 1 % level of significance. The results from the KPSS test show no rejection of the null hypothesis of stationary returns at a 10 % level of significance. Consequently, we detect the return series to show stationary behavior for both sub-periods which allows us to apply the Granger regression method. To analyze Granger-causality we firstly deal with the non-subprime period. As shown in Table 9 we observe a higher frequency of equity indices which Granger-cause CDS indices in the daily data set than on the basis of weekly data. On the weekly basis the stock indices Granger-cause iTraxx Financials Senior and iTraxx Financials Subordinated whereas on the 19 Furthermore, we detect a VAR(2) feedback system on the daily basis between Crossover and DJAuto. Details are again available upon request. 20 Again, according to the Durbin-Watson test the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the "ADF-residuals" can not be rejected.
daily data basis the Granger-causalities cover the complete investigated iTraxx family from iTraxx Europe to iTraxx Financials Subordinated. Note that we displayed all Grangercausalities with a significant Granger-statistic G up to 10 % level of significance. Most of the Granger-causalities are significant at 1 % and 5 % level. Table 9 about here
The number of non-subprime Granger-causalities from CDS to stock indices is reduced to four in total on a weekly and on a daily basis. On weekly basis IBEX is Granger-caused by Crossover, HiVol and NonFin and on daily basis DJA is Granger-caused by FinSen. Since, in addition, two out of four regressions provide only a 10 % level of significance for the Gstatistic, we can conclude that mainly the one-sided information transfer from equity markets to the CDS market is identifiable over the non-subprime period. 21
Furthermore, we observe feedback systems with special participation of the financial sector as can be seen in After dealing with the non subprime-period now we come to the corresponding analysis of the subprime period. Firstly, the fact is shown that, compared to the non-subprime period, there are less equity indices that Granger-cause CDS indices in the subprime period on a weekly basis (see Table 11 ). The related Granger-statistics are mostly only significant at a 10 % level except of one with a 5 % level of significance. On the daily basis subprime Grangercausalities from equity to the CDS market can be observed for all equity indices and for all CDS indices with no special focus on both sides. Daily cross border relationships between Dow Jones Industrial Average to all iTraxx indices exist and are strong. 22 Hence, the number of significant Granger-causalities from equity indices towards CDS indices increased on a daily basis from 35 in the non-subprime period to 42 in the subprime period. Table 12 it is easy to see that on a weekly basis all potential impacts from CDS on equity indices would have been rejected if one would apply a 5 % level of significance. This, in general, is also true for Granger-causalities from equity to CDS markets where only the relationship "IBEX Granger-causes iTraxx Crossover" passes the 5 % level of significance. This fact leads us to the conclusion that weekly Granger-causalities do not play an important role in the subprime period. However, as presented above this is not true for the non-subprime period as there are relevant Granger-causalities within a 5 % level of significance regarding the Granger-statistic. Table 12 about here Furthermore, in the subprime period we also observe a disappearance of a lot of feedback systems (see Table 13 ) in comparison with the non-subprime period. 23 Table 13 about here Three out of four feedback systems are obtained at 1 % or 5 % level of significance where on the equity side the STOXX50 and the Dow Jones Automobile & Parts are involved and on the iTraxx side we find the iTraxx Crossover, iTraxx Financials Senior and Subordinated. Since no financial equity index is picked up by feedback systems the picture has strongly changed compared to the non-subprime situation. Thus, in the subprime period financial equity indices only occur when they Granger-cause CDS indices and not vice versa and not within the framework of feedback systems. Weekly feedback systems did not occur in the subprime period.
To summarize the results we give an overview in Table 14 in which the number of Grangercausalities is presented for the complete as well as for the two sub-periods. With regard to Granger-causality in the sense of "Equity Granger-causes CDS" we firstly realized that weekly data does not play an important role since we only detect a few Grangercausalities for the non-subprime period. Against this background the more interesting case relates to daily data. Beneath many Granger-causalities of the European equity indices to the iTraxx CDS indices we observe a lot of cross-continental causalities of the Dow Jones Industrial Average to European iTraxx CDS indices in the daily data. Although this fact holds for the complete period, for the non-subprime, as well as for the subprime period, the majority of Granger-causalities tends to emerge from the subprime period.
In contrast, the analysis of the case "CDS Granger-causes Equity" shows only a few relationships. Briefly summarized, 6 relationships are found in the complete sample, 4 relationships in the non-subprime and 3 relationships are detected in the subprime samples. Compared to 216 possible Granger-causalities the impact of CDS leading equity indices is negligibly small.
Nearly the same result follows with respect to Feedback systems containing benchmark iTraxx indices. For the iTraxx Crossover index there were 2 systems on a daily basis in the subprime period. The iTraxx HiVol contains 1 system in the complete and another 2 in the non-subprime period on a daily level as well. But for both financial indices (FinSen, FinSub) we observed 10 feedback systems (5 each) on a daily level in the non-subprime period which vanished in the subprime period.
A More Detailed Analysis of Weekly Causalities
The analysis of the previous sections shows significant differences between the results determined on the basis of daily and on the basis of weekly data. On the one hand the number of Granger-causalities detected on a daily basis is considerably higher than on a weekly basis. On the other hand and quite remarkable the coefficients (stock ) i, j prove to be positive on a weekly basis, whereas the daily basis leads to comprehensible negative beta-coefficients. A possible explanation for the latter result is the day-of-the-week effect. As previously stated the weekly returns of the previous sections refer to a Friday-to-Friday examination interval. To verify the robustness of the results we rerun the analysis for the other four possible weekly return intervals Monday-to-Monday, Tuesday-to-Tuesday, Wednesday-to-Wednesday, and Thursday-to-Thursday for the complete, the non-subprime and the subprime period. In Figure  1 the results are presented for all cases that comprise significant Granger-causalities of the direction "Equity index return Granger-causes CDS index return". 24 We only consider this direction because there are just a few uni-directional systems for the opposite direction. Figure 1 present the lower and the upper quartile as well as the median of the beta coefficients. As a first result we find the betas of the first four days of the week to be completely different distributed compared to those of the Friday-to-Friday interval. Hence, we find a day-of the-week effect within our information transfer processes implying the need to interpret the results regarding the Friday-to-Friday return interval with care. Consequently, it is very important for weekly returns to analyze the relationship between different time series for all five possible return intervals and not only for one as this would have led to other conclusions.
Furthermore, the results for the non-subprime period are different to those of the other periods. Primarily, we find more bi-directional systems (27) than for the complete (6) and subprime (11) periods. To our mind, this fact is due to the different sizes of the data histories of the different periods. In addition, results for the complete and for the subprime periods behave nearly identical for the different Day-to-Day return intervals except for Monday when investigating the boxplots. In this context the non-subprime period seems to have a separate day-of-the-week effect on a Monday-to-Monday basis. Nevertheless the Friday day-of-theweek effect is a strong indicator for an information inefficiency of the markets. This Fridayto-Friday effect represents an anomaly in information processing of capital markets.
Another interesting aspect has to be mentioned when considering the detected feedback systems for weekly returns. All significant feedback systems that have been identified in the complete and in the subprime period are no longer existent on daily returns. This effect has been investigated by McCrorie and Chambers (2006) . They showed that less frequent data can lead to feedback systems even if there are only uni-directional causalities on a finer time grid. Against this background they conclude that less frequent data can generate spurious Grangercausalities. Our results confirm their findings in the sense that the relationship "CDS index return Granger-causes the Equity index return" of bi-directional systems for weekly returns obviously is a spurious lead-lag-relationship which is also inconsistent on different day-to-day intervals.
In an environment with no clear leadership the interaction between the returns is difficult to interpret. In consideration of the definition of Granger-causality a situation in which a CDS index return Granger-causes an Equity index return the forecast of the Equity index return can be significantly improved by taking into account the information embedded in the lagged values of the CDS index return. But this may not be interpreted in the sense that the CDS index return is leading the Equity index return by a pure cause-and-effect chain. Feedback system can have various causes. One explanation lies in the possible existence of a third unknown factor which leads both types of indices (see Granger (1969) ). With respect to the results for the complete and subprime period there is evidence for a real leadership of the Equity index returns to the CDS index returns because these findings are confirmed on the finer daily time grid.
Summarizing all results, we conclude that our data of weekly returns is not appropriate for the analysis of lead-lag-relationships because of the day-of-the-week effect. Nevertheless, our findings provide an interesting insight into the relationship between the Equity and the CDS markets and the detected day-of-the-week effect can be used to generate additional profits.
Conclusion
We examined the behavior of the lead-lag-relationship between stock and CDS markets in Europe in the context of the subprime crisis. The results suggest that the information transfer from the stock to the CDS market shows a slightly increasing trend when changing from the non-subprime to the subprime period with, furthermore, a considerable higher number of detected significant Granger-causalities on a daily basis than on a weekly basis.
In most cases the leadership of CDS markets towards equity markets does not play an important role. In a lot of cases these systems would not have been selected if we would have applied a 1 % or a 5 % level of significance to the Granger-statistic. In general, we observe that daily data leads to more Granger-causalities than weekly data independent of a subprime or a non-subprime scenario.
The disappearance of all weekly feedback systems from the non-subprime to the subprime period is another interesting matter of fact and, according to the explanations above, provides a relevant breach of information transfer. In contrast, on a daily basis non-subprime feedback systems are reduced during the subprime crisis and their remains become manifest in onesided systems in the subprime period where in most cases the equity index embeds information before the CDS index does.
Taking the complete sample into account we find negative stock return betas in all cases in the vector autoregression models when analyzing the daily data basis. The opposite is true for weekly data where nearly all stock return betas can be assumed to be positive such that we claim the weekly data behavior to be different in comparison to daily data. The latter result, however, should be interpreted with care since the weekly return series is biased by a day-ofthe-week effect which leads to inconsistent results when assuming various Day-to-Day intervals. The day-of-the-week effect is an indication for information inefficiency of the considered markets which can be used for of development of portfolio management recommendations.
The cross continental impact is identified to be strong as well. There is an one-sided information transfer on a daily basis between Dow Jones Industrial Average and all iTraxx CDS benchmark indices and most iTraxx sector indices. Consequently, we conclude that there is no decoupling of European CDS indices and North-American economy. Concretely, the supersector equity indices (DJBanks, DJFinS, DJAuto, DJInd) provide most relationships on a daily basis and there are only a few relationships on a weekly basis.
Furthermore, the very important phenomenon of financial driven indices should be mentioned. If we consider equity or CDS indices, both types incorporating financials can be suggested to have a high interaction with other indices. Especially, in the subprime period financial equity and CDS indices cover a lot of relationships. These results imply the transfer of systematic risk information from one market to the other for financial indices to be sufficient. Finally, we detect statistical evidence for a strong leadership of equity markets towards CDS markets. Hence, we conclude that systematic risk information is carried from equity into the CDS market. This is the main finding (almost) regardless of the presence of a subprime period or a non-subprime period. Three asterisks stand for a rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance, two asterisks at 5% level of significance, and one asterisk at 10% level of significance. This notation holds for all statistical tests performed in this analysis. Results of the ADF and the KPSS test for weekly and daily returns for the whole sample period. Notes: The results for weekly and daily returns of ADF and KPSS test for the whole sample period are shown in this table with ADF and KPSS representing the particular statistics. HiVol -0.00 -0.13 *** -0.06 *** 6.28 ** Table 7 Granger-causality tests (VAR(1)) for the whole sample period with "Feedback systems" according to the equations (1) and (2) Granger-causality tests (VAR(1)) for the non-subprime period with "Equity returns Granger-cause CDS returns" according to equation (1 Table 10 Granger-causality tests (VAR(1)) for the non-subprime period with "Feedback systems" according to the equations (1) and (2) HiVol 0.00 0.25 *** 0.22 *** 6.33 ** FinSub DJFinS 0.00 -0.37 *** 0.13 *** 6.27 ** DJFinS FinSub 0.00 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 5.39 ** FinSub DJInd 0.00 -0.43 *** 0.13 *** 6.99 *** DJInd FinSub 0.00 0.02 * 0.11 *** 4.46 ** Table 11 Granger-causality tests (VAR(1)) for the subprime period with "Equity returns Granger-cause CDS returns" according to equation (1 daily data Crossover IBEX 0.00 -0.26 *** -0.12 *** 9.13 *** HiVol IBEX 0.00 -0.21 *** 0.13 *** 3.92 ** NonFin IBEX 0.00 -0.33 *** 0.17 *** 15.95 *** FinSen IBEX 0.01 -0.39 *** 0.12 ** 7.43 *** FinSub IBEX 0.01 -0.25 *** 0.15 ** 3.07 * Crossover FTSE 0.00 -0.22 *** -0.11 *** 6.37 ** NonFin FTSE 0.00 -0.30 *** 0.18 *** 12.18 *** FinSen FTSE 0.01 -0.32 *** 0.13 ** 4.81 ** NonFin STO 0.00 -0.24 *** 0.18 *** 8.15 *** Europe DJA 0.00 -0.71 *** 0.04 48.58 *** Crossover DJA 0.00 -0.60 *** -0.14 *** 63.22 *** HiVol DJA 0.00 -0.63 *** 0.10 ** 45.40 *** NonFin DJA 0.00 -0.50 *** 0.18 *** 37.50 *** FinSen DJA 0.01 -0.71 *** 0.12 * 26.25 *** FinSub DJA 0.01 -0.69 *** 0.14 ** 27.16 *** Crossover DAX 0.00 -0.30 *** -0.13 *** 11.40 *** HiVol DAX 0.00 -0.22 *** 0.13 *** 4.53 ** NonFin DAX 0.00 -0.36 *** 0.17 *** 18.35 *** FinSen DAX 0.01 -0.41 *** 0.12 * 7.89 *** FinSub DAX 0.01 -0.37 *** 0.14 ** 6.60 ** Crossover CAC 0.00 -0.26 *** -0.13 *** 9.49 *** HiVol CAC 0.00 -0.19 *** 0.14 *** 3.65 * NonFin CAC 0.00 -0.32 *** 0.17 *** 15.76 *** FinSen CAC 0.01 -0.36 *** 0.12 * 6.94 *** FinSub CAC 0.01 -0.26 *** 0.15 ** 3.77 * Crossover DJBanks 0.00 -0.20 *** -0.13 *** 11.82 *** HiVol DJBanks 0.00 -0.16 *** 0.13 *** 5.20 ** NonFin DJBanks 0.00 -0.24 *** 0.16 *** 17.91 *** FinSen DJBanks 0.01 -0.26 *** 0.12 * 7.48 *** FinSub DJBanks 0.01 -0.25 *** 0.14 ** 7.12 *** Crossover DJFinS 0.00 -0.23 *** -0.13 *** 10.46 *** NonFin DJFinS 0.00 -0.27 *** 0.16 *** 15.24 *** FinSen DJFinS 0.01 -0.29 *** 0.12 * 6.06 ** FinSub DJFinS 0.01 -0.28 *** 0.14 ** 5.73 ** NonFin DJAuto 0.00 -0.13 *** 0.19 *** 10.03 *** Crossover DJInd 0.00 -0.23 *** -0.12 *** 8.94 *** HiVol DJInd 0.00 -0.17 *** 0.14 *** 3.19 * NonFin DJInd 0.00 -0.26 *** 0.17 *** 11.46 *** FinSen DJInd 0.01 -0.33 *** 0.12 * 6.62 ** FinSub DJInd 0.01 -0.22 *** 0.16 *** 2.87 * Table 12 Granger-causality tests (VAR(1)) for the subprime period with "CDS returns Granger-cause Equity returns" according to equation (2 HiVol -0.00 -0.14 *** -0.06 *** 5.71 ** STO FinSen -0.00 -0.11 *** -0.03 3.95 ** Table 13 Granger-causality tests (VAR(1)) for the subprime period with "Feedback systems" according to the equations (1) and (2) daily data Crossover STO -0.00 -0.12 *** -0.06 *** 3.37 * STO Crossover 0.00 -0.17 *** -0.09 *** 3.77 * FinSen DJAuto -0.00 0.10 ** 0.08 * 7.50 *** DJAuto FinSen 0.01 -0.20 *** 0.14 ** 9.52 *** FinSub DJAuto -0.00 0.11 *** 0.08 * 6.64 ** DJAuto FinSub 0.01 -0.22 *** 0.15 *** 12.12 *** Notes: A comparison of relationships in the complete and the split periods is shown in this table. A blank square denotes that no relationships are found containing the specified index. The number of black squares denotes the number of relationships found for the specified index. These results include Granger-causalities of higher lag order. Fig. 1 . The boxplots present lower, upper quartile and median (dot line) of the beta coefficients of the significant Granger-causalities. The lines above and below the boxes describe the range of the coefficients.
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